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ADDITIVITIES IN FUZZY COALITION GAMES 
WITH SIDE-PAYMENTS1 
MILAN MARES 
The fuzzy coalition game theory brings a more realistic tools for the mathematical 
modelling of the negotiation process and its results. In this paper we limit our attention to 
the fuzzy extension of the simple model of coalition games with side-payments, and in the 
frame of this model we study one of the elementary concepts of the coalition game theory, 
namely its "additivities", i.e., superadditivity, subadditivity and additivity in the strict 
sense. In the deterministic game theory these additivites indicate the structure of eventual 
cooperation, namely the extent of finally formed coalitions, if the cooperation is possible. 
The additivities in fuzzy coalition games play an analogous role. But the vagueness of the 
input data about the expected coalitional incomes leads to consequently vague validity of 
the superadditivity, subadditivity and additivity. In this paper we formulate the model 
of this vagueness depending on the fuzzy quantities describing the expected coalitional 
pay-offs, and we introduce some elementary results mostly determining the links between 
additivities in a deterministic coalition game and its fuzzy extensions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The fuzzy coalition game theory is a natural field of applications of the fuzzy set 
theory to an originally deterministic model of essentially deeply vague phenomenon. 
There are several models of coalition games differing in the degree of freedom in 
the distributions of coalition pay-offs among its members. The simplest type of 
coalition game is the game with side-payments which accepts the assumption of 
existence of a universal and linear representative of utility. This representative is 
used as a medium for the re-distribution of the total profit of a coalition among 
the players without any loss or other deformation of utility values transferred inside 
the coalition. In the practical situations, this assumption appears non-realistic, and 
it can be fulfilled only approximately. Anyhow, the games with side-payments are 
the first type of coalition games which were thoroughly investigated, and the results 
derived for them belong to the fundaments of the coalition game theory. 
2The research summarized in this paper was supported by the Academy of Sciences of the 
Czech Republic Key Project No. K1075601, by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, grant 
No. 402/96/0414, by ACE-Phare Project P 95-2014-R, and by Ministry for Education, Youth and 
Sports of CR Project No. VS 96063. 
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In this paper we deal with a fuzzification of the mentioned type of game. The 
previous attempt to this problem was done in [9], and some elementary results were 
derived. Anyhow, the width of the considered game model justifies the endeavour to 
investigate its particular components separately and in more details. The concepts 
of superadditivity, subadditivity and additivity belong to the most significant. The 
fulfilment of these properties indicates the form of the negotiated coalition structure. 
If the game is superadditive then the negotiated stable distributions of profit (the 
"core" of the game), if such stable distribution exists, can be realized by the coalition 
of all players (cf. [12, 13]). On the other hand, if the game is subadditive then no 
cooperation can be achieved, and also in the additive game the pay-offs of players are 
their pay-offs in one-element coalitions without respect to the extent of the coalition 
in which they are distributed. 
The fuzzification of the coalition game models of various types is natural (see 
[1, 3, 4]). It can include the possibility of a set of players to play more games 
parallelly with different "intensity" of participation (see [1], and certain pre-attempt 
was done also in [8]), or it can reflect the fact that, in the time of the negotiation 
and coalition forming, the terminal coalitional profits can be known only vaguelly 
(cf., [3, 4, 9]). The latter approach was chosen also in this paper. We suppose that 
the knowledge of the expected results of cooperation can be only vague, and the 
terminal result depends on numerous external factors. The vagueness of the input 
knowledge implies the vagueness in the validity of some important properties of the 
game like the existence of solution (see [4, 9]) or the validity of the superadditivity 
property (see [3]). Mainly, some of the first results presented in [3] are extended, 
completed and discussed in the following sections. 
2. FUZZY QUANTITY 
The concepts of fuzzy quantity and fuzzy number were delt in several works (see, for 
example, [2, 5, 6]) and they are well known as fuzzy set theoretical models of vague 
numbers. As we use them in the following sections to describe the vague pay-offs it 
is useful to remember briefly some concepts and notations related to them. 
We denote by R the set of real numbers. Fuzzy subset a of R, with membership 
function fia ' R —• [0,1] such that: 
there exists xa G R such that fjLa(xa) = 1, (1) 
there exist xi, x*i G R, x\ < xa < £2, such that fia(x) = 0 for all x £ [,r1,X2], (2) 
is called a fuzzy quantity and xa is its modal value. The sets of fuzzy quantities will 
be denoted by JR. 
If a, 6 G M then their sum a © b is also fuzzy quantity with membership function 
Va®b(x) = sup [min(/ia(?/), fib(x - y))], x G R. (3) 
yen 
It is also possible to substract the fuzzy quantities by means of the formula a© (—6) 
where /i_6(x) = /i&(—x) for all x G R (cf. [5] and [6]). 
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Fuzzy quantities can be compared and there exist numerous conceptions of ordermg-
like relations over JR. In this paper we use one of them which stresses the fuzzy 
charracter of the ordering of fuzzy numbers. If a, 6 G JR then the possibility of 
a }z b) i. e. of "a is greater or equivalent to 6" is defined as a number 
v(a y b) = sup [m'm(fia(x), fib(y))]. (4) 
x£R, y£R 
x > y 
It is also possible to define fuzzy "equality" between fuzzy quantities (see [5, 6]) 
as a fuzzy relation a ~ b} a, b G JR which is valid with possibility 
v*(a ~ b) = sup [min(/ia(x), fib(x))]. (5) 
Its relation to fuzzy "inequality" a ^ b is discussed in [6], e.g. Here, we remember 
that the logical conjunction a ^ J and b ^ a is not equivalent to a ~ 6, what means 
a significant difference between fuzzy and crisp quantities. In general 
v*(a ~ b) = v*(b ~ a) < min f v(a >z 6), v(b ^ a)) • (6) 
If fuzzy quantities are partwise monotonous, i. e., their membership functions /za, fib 
are continuous and increasing for x < xa or x < x\}) fia(x) = 1 for x G [xa,xj,] or 
fib(x) = 1 for x G [-Cfc,-Cfc] and they are decreasing (and continuous) for x > xa or 
x > xb, respectively (where xa < xa, Xb < xb) then the inequality in (6) turns into 
equality. The properties of the operation of summation a © 6 and of the ordering 
relation a )z b are introduced in [5] and briefly summarized in [6]. 
3. DETERMINISTIC COALITION GAME WITH SIDE-PAYMENTS 
The type of game whose fuzzy extension will be investigated in the following sections 
is in its deterministic form defined as a pair (7, v) where I is a (non-empty and finite) 
set of players and v is a mapping, v : 21 —* R such that for every coalition K C / , 
value v(K) G R represents the total pay-off of the coalition K. The mapping v is 
called the characteristic function of (/, t>), and we suppose i>(0) = 0. 
We say that the game (7, v) is superadditive if for all pairs of disjoint coalitions 
K, LCI, KnL = Q1 
v(KUL)>v(K) + v(L), (7) 
we say that the game is subadditive iff for any pair K, L C I, K D L = 0, the 
inequality 
v(KUL) <v(K) + v(L) (8) 
holds, and we say that it is additive iff it is both, superadditive and subadditive. 
Moreover, we say that (7, v) is convex iff for any pair of coalitions 7i", L C I 
v(K U L) + v(K n l ) > v(K) + v(L). (9) 
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It is evident that convexity implies superadditivity. 
Finally, let us denote for every coalition K C T by V(K) C Rr the set 
V(K) = {x = (*,.).•€/ € R1 : £ , . € A . x, < t,(K)} • (10) 
Then it can be easily seen (cf. [9]) that the game (I, v) is superadditive if and only 
if for any K, L C I, K H L = 0, the inclusion 
V(A'UL) DV(A7)nV(L) (11) 
holds. Each vector x = (x t) t G / G R
1 or, more generally, £/<- = (x t),Gx E IZ
K is 
called an imputation in the game (I, v). 
4. FUZZY-QUANTITIES-BASED APPROACH 
Let us consider a coalition game with side-payments (I ,v), and let us suppose that 
the crisp numbers v(K), K C I, are not exactly known. It means that we can 
substitute them by vague (i.e. fuzzy) quantities. Then the pair (z, w) where w : 
21 —• 1R) i.e., w(K) is a fuzzy quantity with membership function fiK ' R —• [0,1], 
such that 
HKHK)) = 1, (12) 
and for K = 0, fJ.$(0) = 1, /-^(z) = 0 for x 7-- 0, is called a fuzzy extension of the 
game (I,v). As follows from (12), v(K) is (not necessarily single) modal value of 
w(K). The mapping w will be called fuzzy characteristic function of (I, w). 
4.1. Fuzzy superadd itivity 
Let (I, v) be a coalition game with side-payments and (I, w) be its fuzzy extension. 
Then (I, w) is fuzzy superadditive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions K) LCI, 
K n L = 0, 
uv(A'UL) fc uv(IY')0uv(L). (13) 
The possibility of (13) for a given pair If, L C I is, due to (4), equal to the number 
v(w(K U L) fc w(K) © uv(L)) = sup [min(/iw(/cuL)(z), /MK)etz,(L)(y))] » (
14) 
* > y 
which we briefly denote I7(Ii', L), and the possibility that the fuzzy coalition game 
(I, w) is superadditive is 
lWerU, W) = m i n (HK> L) ' K> L C / , K n L = 0) . (15) 
The following elementary statements can be formulated. 
Remark 1. If K, L C I, K n £ = 0, then evidently 77(If, L) = U(L, K) as If U L = 
L U If and (3) implies w(K) © tu(L) = w(L) © w(K) (see also [5, 6]). 
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Remark 2. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of (I, v) and IT, LCI, K 0 L = 0, then 
u(A U L) > v(K) + v(L) implies V(K, L) = 1 as follows from (12) and (4). 
Lemma 1. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of a game (I, v) and if (I, v) is superad-
ditive then vSuper(I,
 w) = I-
P r o o f . Lemma follows from Remark 2 and (15), immediately. • 
Lemma 2. Let (I, w) and (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of a game (I, v), with mem-
bership functions /i/<-, fi'K for u>(I\), w'(K)} respectively, where A' C I. Let for 
a pair of disjoint coalitions A", L C I,I-KuL(#) > A^uLC^)) / iK(x) > AXK(X) an<^ 
A*L(X) > ^ L W f° r aU z £ -R) a n d l e t u s denote by F(I\, L) and ^(K, L) values (14) 
for the games (I, w) and (I, u/), respectively. Then v(K, L) > F^A', L). 
P r o o f . The statement follows from (14) and from the assumptions, immediately. 
D 
The previous lemma immediately implies the following statement. 
Theorem 1. Let (I, w) and (I, w') fulfil the assumptions of Lemma 2, then 
I'superU,™) > J ' s u p e r U V ) * 
if /i/c(z) > n'K(
x) f° r all K C I , z G I2. 
The methodological principle used in the previous statements can lead to a con-
clusion that increasing fuzziness of a coalition game can increase the possibility of 
its superadditivity which idea can be extended ad extremum. 
Theorem 2. Let (I, v) be a deterministic coalition game. Then there exists its 
fuzzy extension (I,w) which is superadditive with possibility i/Super(-
r, w) — 1-
P r o o f . Let (I, v) be coalition game. If it is superadditive then any its exten-
sion (I, w) is also superadditive with possibility ^super(I, w) = 1, as follows from 
Lemma 1. Let (I, v) be not superadditive and let us construct, for any coalition 
K C I the number yK E R in the following way. If K is one-element coalition, 
K = {i}, i G I, then y{i} = v({i}). 
If K = {ij}} i, j G I, i 7-- i , then 
t/K = max (v(K), y{i] + y{j}) , 
and we continue iteratively. For any K C I having at least three elements and any 
i G K we denote AT = (K — {i}) U {i}. If the numbers yK-{i}, 2/{t} a r e constructed 
then we put 
yK = max (max (v(K), y{i} + yK-{i})) • (16) 
t£K 
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Then yK > v(K) for every K C I and we construct the fuzzy extension (I, w) of 
(I, v) so that for any K C I, 
HK(X) = 1 for x e[v(K), yK] 
and fulfils the demands of (2). Then for every pair of disjoint coalitions K, L the 
inequality 
yKuL >yK + yL 
is fulfilled. Definitions (4) and (14), immediately imply that V(K,L) = 1 and the 
statement is valid. D 
The previous two theorems reflect a relatively natural principle. Increasing vague-
ness means that more properties become possible. On the other hand, the extremal 
possibility - certainty - in the case of superadditivity being represented by the value 
-ysuper(-r, w) = 1, is achievable only if we extend the set of certain profits of coalitions, 
i. e. the set 
{xeR:fiK(x)=l}. (17) 
If (I,w) extends the game (/, v) in rather more realistic way where the sets (17) 
contain only one number x = v(K) then the certainty of superadditivity is limited 
to the fuzzy extensions of superadditive games as shown in the following statement. 
Theo rem 3. Let (I, w) be a fuzzy extension of a coalition game (I, v) and let for 
every coalition K C I ^K(X) = 1 iff x = v(K). Then fVSUper(-
r, w) = 1 if and only 
if (I, v) is superadditive. 
P r o o f . One implication follows from Theorem 1. Let us prove the remaining 
one. Let K, L C I be disjoint coalitions and let 
v(KUL) < v(K) + v(L), 
so that (I, v) is not superadditive. Then V(K, L) < 1 as for any pair x, y E I2, x > y, 
either x ^ v(K U L) or y ^ v(K) + v(L) and, hence, fJ.w(K)®w(L)(y) < 1 as follows 
from (3) (cf. also [5]). It means that also vSuper(I,
w) < 1. D 
4.2. Fuzzy subadd it ivity 
The concept of fuzzy subadditivity is in certain sense a counterpart to the superaddi-
tivity, and the definitions and statements which can be formulated in this subsection 
have their analogies in the previous one. 
If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of coalition game with side-payments (I, v) then it 
is fuzzy subadditive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions K, L C I 
w(K) 0 w(L) >z w(K U L). (18) 
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The possibility of (18) for a given pair A", L C I is, due to (4), equal to the number 
v ((w(K) 0 w(L)) >z w(K U L)) = sup [min(fiw{K)^w(<L)(x), fiw(KuL)(y))] 
^ / x, y € « 
x > y 
(19) 
which we briefly denote J/(A', L), and the possibility that the fuzzy coalition game 
(I, w) is subadditive is 
"sub(/, w) = min (v(A, L) : A, L C I, A n L = 0) . (20) 
The direct analogies of the statements on superadditivity are the following ones. 
Remark 3. If A, L C I, A n L = 0 then */(A, L) = */(L, A). 
Remark 4. If (I, uv) is a fuzzy extension of (I, v) and A", L C I, A" n L = 0, then 
v(A) + u(L) > v(K U L) implies i/(A, L) = 1. 
Lemma 3. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of a game (I, v) and if (I, v) is subadditive 
then i/Sub(-
r, w) = 1-
P r o o f . The theorem follows from Remark 4 and (20), immediately. • 
Lemma 4. Let (I, w) and (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of a game (I, t>) with mem-
bership functions fiK, fi
f
K for w(K), w'(K), respectively. Let for a pair of disjoint 
coalitions A, L C I, HKUL(X) > A^uL^)* Wr(s) > A4T(Z) and I/L(-c) > /i^(x) for 
all x E I2, and let us denote by i/(A, L) and l/;(A, L) values (16) for the respective 
games. Then i/(A, L) > i/(A, L). 
P r o o f . The statement follows from (19), immediately. • 
Theorem 4. Let (I, w), (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of (I, v), then 
l'subU,™) > Vsub(I,vv')> 
if fiK(x) > n'K(x) for all A C I and x E R. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Lemma 4 and from (20), immediately. • 
Also in this case the previous result can be driven to the extremal case. 
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Theorem 5. Let (I, v) be a deterministic coalition game. Then there exists its 
fuzzy extension (I,w) which is subadditive with possibility vSub(I)
w) — 1-
P r o o f . The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 2. We briefly remember only 
the steps which are rather modified. If (I,v) is subadditive then, due to Lemma 3, 
any of its fuzzy extensions is subadditive. If (I, v) is not subadditive then we con-
struct numbers ZK E R for each K C I such that for K = {i}, £{i} = K{*})- ^ o r 
any K having at least two elements, K = (K - {i}) U {i} for each i 6 K and we put 
zK = min lv(K),mm(zK_{i}, z{i])J . (21) 
Then for any K C I, ZK < v(K) and for any Ky L C I, KCiL = 0, ZKUL < ZK + ZL-
We construct the fuzzy extension (I, w) of (I, v) such that for each K C I 
VK(X) = 1 for x e [zK, v(K)]. 
Then it can be easily shown, using (4) and (19), that for any disjoint K, LCI the 
equality v(K, L) = 1 holds and ^sub(^, w) = 1. • 
Even in the case of subadditivity it is easy to show that its extension to any 
game by means of its fuzzification is possible only if we admit also other certain 
values than v(K). Otherwise, the equivalence between certain subadditivity of a 
fuzzy game and the subadditivity of its crisp pattern is easily provable. 
Theorem 6. Let (I, w) be a fuzzy extension of a coalition game (I, v) and let for 
every A" C I, V>K(X) = 1 iff x = v(K). Then ^sub(-r)^I) = 1 if and only if (I, v) is 
subadditive. 
P r o o f . The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3. • 
4 .3. Fuzzy addi t iv i ty 
The additivity of a deterministic coalition game is a conjunction of its super- and 
subadditivity, as formulated in Section 3. Its generalization can be defined as follows: 
We say that a fuzzy game (I, w) if fuzzy additive if it is both, fuzzy superadditive 
and fuzzy subadditive. Then the possibility of additivity is equal to the number 
^addit(-r, w) = min (^suPer(-
r, w), vsub(I', w)). (22) 
Remark 5. If we denote for any K, LCI, K 0 L = 0 the number 
v(K, L) = min (V(K, L), v(K, L)) (23) 
then, evidently, 
i/addit(J, w) = min (v(K, L) : K, L C I, K 0 L = 0) . (24) 
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Remark 6. It is evident that v(K,L) = v(L,K) for any disjoint K, L C 7, and 
for v(K UL) = v(K) + v(L) also v(K, L) = 1. 
It means that we can formulate an analogy of Lemmas 1 and 3. 
Lemma 5. If (7, w) is a fuzzy extension of a game (7, v) and if (7, v) is additive 
then i/additU, w) = 1. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Remark 6 and (22), immediately. • 
Theorem 7. Let (7, w) and (7, w') be fuzzy extensions of a game (7, v) with mem-
bership functions /i#, \i'K for w(K), w'(K), respectively. Let for any coalition 7\ C 7 
and for any x £ R, ^K(X) > ^'K(X)- Then 
^addit(7, w) > f/addit(7,uv
/)-
P r o o f . The theorem follows from Theorems 1 and 4 and from (22). • 
Theorem 8. Let (7, v) be a deterministic coalition game. Then there exists its 
fuzzy extension (7, w) which is additive with possibility ^addit(^) w) = I-
P r o o f. It is sufficient to combine the proofs of Theorems 2 and 5 and to construct 
for every K C 7 numbers yK, ZK € R such that for one-element coalitions {z}, i E 
7, 2//t\ = z/j} = v{i} and for other coalitions the iterative formulas (16) and (21) 
are used. Evidently ZK < v(K) < yK for all K C 7, and it is correct to define w(K) 
by HK(X) = 1 for all x E [ZKIVK]- Then, analogously to the proofs of Theorems 2 
and 5, v(K, L) = 1 for all disjoint K, L C 7, and, consequently, ^addit(J, uv) = 1. • 
Theorem 9. Let (7, w) be a fuzzy extension of a game (7, v) such that for all 
K C 7, LLK(X) = 1 iff x = u(7Q. Then tvaddit(-
r, w) = 1 if and only if (7, v) is 
additive. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Theorems 3 and 6 and from (24), immedi-
ately. • 
The deterministic coalition games with side-payments offer two equivalent ap-
proaches to the definition of additivity. 
By the first approach, (7,t>) is additive iff it is both, superadditive and subaddi-
tive. 
By the second approach, (7, v) is additive iff for any pair of disjoint coalitions 
K, LCI 
v(KUL) = v(K) + v(L). (25) 
The equivalence of both approaches, which is evident in the deterministic case, 
is generally not preserved for the fuzzy extensions of the coalition games. In the 
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previous paragraphs, we have generalized the first one, and defined the possibility 
-yaddit(^,^) by (22) which can be supported, via (24), by analogous relation (23) 
related to particular pairs c" disjoint coalitions. 
The fuzzification of the second approach demands using fuzzy "equality" (5), to 
define for any pair of disjoint coalitions K, LCI the possibility 
v* (w(K U L) ~ tv(I\) © w(L)) = sup [min (PKUL(X)> PW{K)®W{L)(X)]\ (26) 
xeR 
which we briefly denote v*(K,L). Using (26) we may define the possibility that 
(I, w) is additive under the second approach as a number 
^dd i t (L^) = min(u'(K,L) :K,LC I, K n L = 0) • (27) 
Relation (6) implies that 
u'(K,L)<u(K,L) and ^ d d i t ( L u») < uaddh(I, w) (28) 
for disjoint I\, LCI. The result mentioned in the conclusive paragraph of Section 2 
shows one of the conditions under which inequalities (28) turn into equalities. 
The possibilities v*(K, L) and v*dd-lt(I, w) fulfil properties, analogous to the ones 
of i/(I\, L) and ^addit(-r) w). Namely, it is easy to see the validity of the following 
statements. 
Remark 7. If A', L are disjoint coalitions then v*(K, L) = v*(L} K) and v*(K, L) = 
= 1 \[v(K) + v(L) = v(K\JL). 
Lemma 6. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of (I, v) and if (I, v) is additive then 
l / add i t ( 7 ^) = I/addit(-r,^) = I-
P r o o f . The statement follows from Remark 7 and (27). • 
Theorem 10. Let (I, w) and (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of a game (I, v) fulfilling 
assumptions of Theorem 7. Then vlddlt(I,w) > ^additU'™')-
P r o o f . The theorem follows from (26) and (27), immediately. • 
Theorem 11. Let (I, v) be a deterministic coalition game. Then there exists its 
fuzzy extension (I, w) which is additive with possibility ^additC^j^) = 1-
P r o o f . The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 8. • 
Theorem 12. Let (I, w) be a fuzzy extension of a game (I, v) such that for all 
K C I, VK(X) = 1 iff x = v(K). Then J'additU*™) = 1 if and only if (I, v) is 
additive. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from (26) and (27), immediately. • 
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4.4. Discussion of fuzzy convexity 
The fuzzification of the convexity concept (9) is connected with certain ambiguity. 
In the deterministic coalition game (I, v), two equivalent inequalities, namely 
v(K U L) + v(K nL)> v(K) + v(L) (29) 
and 
v(K U L ) > v(K) + v(L) - v(K H L) 
for A, LCI, are arbitrarily used to verify the convexity property. In the case 
of fuzzy extension (I, w) of (I, v) this arbitrarity cannot be accepted as the fuzzy 
inequality relations 
w(i< u L) e w(i< n L) >: w(K) © w(L) (30) 
and 
uv(AUL) >: w(K) ® w(L) ® (-w(K n L)), 
where fi-w(KnL)(
x) = AiKnL(—-c) (remember Section 2) for all x £ R, are not 
equivalent. Some more details about their mutual relations can be derived from the 
results summarized in [5] and [6]. They reach beyond the subjects of this paper. 
For our purpose we accept the convention that the fuzzy game (I, w) is convex iff it 
fulfills (30) as a fuzzification of (29). (In fact, the approach based on the inequality 
w(K U l ) ^ w(K) © w(L) © (—w(K n L)) leads to quantitatively different values 
of possibilities but the qualitative relations, namely between the convexity of (I, v) 
and (I,uv) are equivalent.) 
If we accept this approach then the procedure can be very analogous to the one 
used in the previous subsections. For every pair of coalitions A, L C I we denote 
the possibility of (30) as a real number 7r(A, L) by means of (4) 
7r(A,L) = v(w(KUL)®w(KnL) >z w(K)®w(L)) (31) 
= sup [mm(fiw(KuL)ew(KnL)(x)} Hw(K)@w(L)(y))] • 
x > y 
Then the possibility that (I, w) is convex is 
7TConv(/, w) = m i n ( T T ( A , L) : A , LCI). (32) 
Analogously to the previous cases, it is easy to verify the following statements. 
Remark 8. Evidently, n(K, L) = 7r(L, A) for A, LCI. 
Remark 9. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of (I, v) and if, for some A", LCI, 
v(K U L) + v(K H L) > v(K) + v(L) then TT(A, L) = 1. 
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Lemma 7. If the A, L C I, K H L = 0 then ?r(A, L) = 77(A, L). 
P r o o f . Using (3), (12) and the assumption that, for empty coalition 0, fi$(Q) = 
1, fi$(x) = 0 if x ^ 0 (cf. introduction of Section 4) it is easy to prove (see [5]) that 
w(K U L) 0 w(K fl L) = w(K U L). Then the statement follows from (30) and (13), 
or from (31) and (14), immediately. D 
Lemma 8. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of a game (I, v) and if (I, v) is convex 
then 7rconv(I, w) = 1. 
P r o o f . The statement follows from Remark 9, immediately. • 
Lemma 9. Let (I, w) and (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of a game (I, v) with mem-
bership functions /!#, fifK of w(K), w'(K)} respectively, where K C I. Let for 
a pair of coalitions A', L C I, ^K(X) > ^'K(X)^ ^L(X) > ML,^)' VKUL(X) > 
/ iKuL(x)' ^KC\L(X) > A'A'nLC^)' f° r al- x € R, and let us denote by 7r(I\, L) and 
n'(K)L) values (31) for (I, w), (I, u/) , respectively. Then ir(K,L) > -K'(K}L). 
P r o o f . The statement follows from (31), and from the assumptions, immediately. 
D 
Theorem 11. Let (I, w), (I, w') be fuzzy extensions of (I, v), let the notations of 
Lemma 9 be preserved and let HK(X) > ^'K(X) f° r all a: G I? and K C I. Then 
irconv(I,w) > TTconv^.uv')-
P r o o f . The theorem follows from Lemma 9, and (32), immediately. • 
T h e o r e m 12. Let (I, v) be a deterministic coalition game. Then there exists its 
fuzzy extension (I,w) which is convex with possibility 7rconv(-
r, w) = 1. 
P r o o f . The proof of this statement uses procedure analogous to the one of 
Theorems 2,5 and 8. 
For every K C I we define number tK £ R in the following way. For one-element 
coalitions K = {i} we put //,-} = v({i}) and then, iteratively, for any M C I we put 
tM = max{i ; (M),max{^ + tL - v(K fl L) : A, L C I, A U L -= M}} . (33) 
Then for every K, L C I tK >
 V(K) and 
*KuL + *KnL > ^KuL + v(K nL)>tK+tL 
and we have constructed new deterministic game (I, v') where v'(K) = tK, K C I. 
This game is convex. Let us define its extension (I, w) such that for every K C I, 
tK(
x) = 1 for x G [v(K), v'(K)]. 
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The fuzzy game (7, w) is a fuzzy extension of both (7, v) and (7, vf) and the convexity 
of (7,t/) means, due to Theorem 11, that (7,iv) is fuzzy convex with possibility 
7Tconv(7,uv) = 1 . • 
Even in the case of convexity, the fuzzy extension which respects the condition 
HK(X) < 1 for x / v(K) cannot be certainly fuzzy convex. 
Theorem 13. Let (7, w) be a fuzzy extension of a coalition game (7, v) and let for 
every K C 7, JJ.K(X) = 1 iff x = v(K). Then 7rconv(7, w) = 1 if and only if (7, v) is 
convex. 
P r o o f , The proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 3. If (7, v) is convex then 
7Tconv(7, w) = 1 due to Theorem 11. If it is not convex then there exists a pair of 
coalitions K, L C I such that 
v(K UL) + v(K H L) < v(K) + v(L) 
and then, due to the assumption, and due to (4) and (31), TT(K, L) < 1. Hence, also 
7Tconv(7, w) < 1. D 
5. FUZZY ADMISSIBLE IMPUTATIONS 
Another approach to the possibilities of superadditivity and similar concepts in the 
fuzzy coalition game is generally possible, as well. It is based on the sets of achievable 
and admissible imputations and for the deterministic case it was briefly mentioned 
in Section 3 in connection with formulas (10) and (11). Here, we formulate this 
alternative model for the superadditivity case, only. The treatment of subadditivity 
and additivity analogous to (11) demands rather wider aparatus (see [7]) and the 
analogous formulation of the convexity concept differs from (9) but also from (11) 
in a significant degree (as shown in [10]). 
Let us consider a deterministic coalition game (7, v) and its fuzzy extension (7, w), 
and let us define for every coalition K C I a fuzzy subset W(K) of R1 with mem-
bership function XK • R1 —• [0,1], where for every x = (-Et)t€/> 
XK(x) = sup iiK(y) : y £ 7t, J2K
 xi<y • (34) 
For empty coalition K = 0, \$(x) = 1 for all x £ R1) which is correct with respect 
to (34). 
Remark 10. If (7, v) is a coalition game and (7, w) is its fuzzy extension then for 
every x £ V(7Q, where V(7\) is defined by (10), the equality XK(X) = 1 follows 
from (10), (34) and (12). 
It is possible to proceed completely analogously to (11) and to say that the fuzzy 
game (7, w) is imputationally superadditive iff for any K, L C 7, K C\ L = 0, 
W(K UL)D W(K) H W(L) (35) 
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in the fuzzy set theoretical sense, i .e. 
AtfuL(-c) > min {\K{X), AL(x)) for all x £ Rr. (36) 
This procedure copies the deterministic approach (11) (see also [3]) but it excludes 
the fuzziness from the superaddit ivi ty of fuzzy games. Inclusion (35) is either valid 
or not and there is no space for any vagueness. It is possible to base the possibility 
of the superadditivity on the method of a-cuts, suggested in [3]. If a £ R} a £ (0, 1], 
and if K C I then we denote by W ( o r ) a fuzzy subset of R1 with the membership 
function A(of) : It7 - > [ 0 , a ] 
\(£]{x) = min{c*, \K(x)}, X £ It
7. (37) 
Then we say tha t the game (I, w) is imputation ally a-supcradditive iff 
a = min [sup(/3 £ (0, 1] : WW(K U L) D W^{K) n W ( / 5 ) (L ) ) : (38) 
K, L C I, I\ n L = 
it means 
min sup(/? £ (0, 1] : V , £ It
7, X(PuL{x) > m i n ( A
( « ( ^ ) , *<?>(*))) : (39) 
I\, L c I, I\ n F = 0 . 
The imputat ional superaddit ivity (35), (36) is an imputat ional 1-superadditivity in 
the terms of (38), (39). The value a £ (0,1] for which the fuzzy game (I, w) is 
imputationally a-superaddit ive can be also considered for an alternative possibility 
of the fuzzy superadditivity. Unfortunately, mutua l relations between both fuzzy 
superadditivities, the imputat ional a-superaddit ivi ty and i'SUper(-''> w), are very weak. 
Namely, they reverse the directions of implication between the deterministic and 
fuzzy superadditivity . 
T h e o r e m 14. If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of a game (I, v) and if (I, w) is impu-
tationally 1-superadditive then (I, v) is superadditive. 
P r o o f . The s ta tement follows from (38), (7), from (11) and from Remark 10. 
If (I, w) is imputationally 1-superadditive then W(I\ U L) D W ( I \ ) n W ( L ) for 
any disjoint pair of coalitions. It means, due to Remark 10, tha t also V(I\ U L) D 
V(I \) fl V{L) and the equivalence between the superadditivity and (11), mentioned 
in Section 3 (see also [7]) proves the s ta tement . D 
C o r o l l a r y . If (I, w) is a fuzzy extension of (I, v) and if (I, w) is imputationally 
1-superadditive then z>'super(-r, w) = 1 as follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 14. 
The previous theorem and its corollary can be for a special but important class 
of fuzzy games extended into the following s ta tement . 
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Theorem 15- Let (I,w) be a fuzzy extension of a coalition game (7, v) and let 
for every coalition K C I, HK(X) be increasing for x < v(K) and decreasing for 
x > v(K). If (I,w) is imputationally a-superadditive then 
& < -'super (J ,™)-
P r o o f . If (7,iI) is superadditive then vSUper(I,
w) = 1, due to Lemma 1, and 
the inequality is guaranteed as a E (0)1]- If vsuper(I,w) < 1 then (/, v) is not 
superadditive as follows from Lemma 1, and there exists a pair of disjoint coalitions 
A', L C I such that i/(/\, L) < 1, 
v(K U L) < v(K) + v(L) 
and, moreover, 
si = sup (x G R : HKUL(X) = 1) < inf (x G R : / ^ ( K ) © ^ ) ^ ) = l) = s2 
as follows from (4) and (14). Then, due to the assumptions of this theorem, with 
respect to (4) (or (14)), 
v(K,L) = fiKuL(-ro) = Hw(K)®w(L)(xo) 
for some XQ G R such that s\ < XQ < s2. It means that for all x > XQ, 
VKUL(X) <IJ.KUL(XQ) < 1 
and, as follows from the monotonicity of /i/cuL. also \KUL(X) < \K\JL(XO) < 1 for 
x > XQ. It means that also for x\ = v(K) + v(L) > £n, this inequality holds. On the 
other hand, \K(V(K)) = \L(V(L)) = 1 and, consequently, 
AKUL(-TI) < min(A K KA)) , \L(v(L))) = 1, 
and, certainly, W(AUL) D W(A)nW(L) is not true. If there exists a G (0,1] such 
that 
W (a)(A' U L) D W ( a ) (A) H W^Q)(L), 
it means 
X^L{x)>mm(x^\x),\^\x)), 
then the a-cut must be such that for all x G R 
A/CUL < AKUL(-CI) < \KUL(XO) = HKUL(XO) = ^(A,L), 
and this must be valid also for \KUL(X) = a- Hence> a < U(K> L) also for the pair 
A, L C / , K fl L = 0, which minimizes the right-hand-side of formula (15) and, 
consequently 
<*< i'superU.™)- D 
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The approach to the superadditivity, which is based on the concept of the sets 
V(K) and W(K) of achievable (possibly achievable) imputations is rather more ad-
equate to the model of coalition games without side-payments. In the deterministic 
case, it was shown in [7]. For the case of coalition games with side-payments, which 
is investigated in this paper, it is limited to the lineary bounded achievable sets 
of imputations. The imputational superadditivity or a-superadditivity has weaker 
bounds to the deterministic superadditivity of the original deterministic game which 
was extended to its fuzzy counterpart than the superadditivity based on processing of 
fuzzy quantities dealt in Subsection 4.1. It is caused by the close similarity between 
both, deterministic and fuzzy, processing of the coalitional pay-offs, represented by 
(7) and (14), (15). On the other hand, the imputational superadditivity more ev-
idently reflects the proper sense of the superadditivity, namely the fact that in a 
superadditive game everything what can be realized by a group of (disjoint) coali-
tions can be realized also by their union, including the set of all players. In more 
formal presentation, if /C = {K\,..., A'm}, Ki C\ Kj = 0, i ^ j , A'i U • • • U Km = I 
is a coalition structure and if the vector of imputations x = (x,-)ie/ can be realized 
by coalitions from /C, i.e. 
XKj<v(Kj), j = l , . . . , m , where xKj = ^ K x{ 
or if x E VV(I\;), j = l , . . . , m , with possibility AK>(-C), then x G W(I) with 
possibility 
\i(x) > \KJ(X) for all Kj G /C. 
However, this relation is more evident for the imputational superadditivity, it 
is in its essential sense valid also for the superadditivity based on the concept of 
-ysuper(-r, w). Namely, if /C = {A"i,..., Km} is a coalition structure, if x = (:Ct)ieJ G 
R1, where we denote for any Kj G /C 
XK* = J2Kj
 X|"' XI = Ej Xi = Sj=i XK" 
if we denote by w(K,) the fuzzy quantity 
w(K) = w(Ki) 0 w(K2) 0 • -®w(Km) 
and if fijc is the membership function of w(K) then (3) easily implies that 
VK(X) > VKj(x) for all j = 1,..., m. 
6. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
The superadditivity and related concepts like subadditivity, additivity and in certain 
degree also convexity belong to the elementary ones in the deterministic coalition 
game theory. They represent the first criteria for the admissibility of large (or small) 
coalitions and the first indicators of the possible forms of eventual cooperation. 
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Their elementarity and simplicity causes tha t they are only briefly mentioned in 
the works subjected to the classical problems of the coalition game theory in its 
deterministic form (see, for example, [12, 13]) and they were treated analogously 
briefly in the previous papers oriented to the fuzzy extensions of those games (like 
[3, 4, 9, 11]). Even the transition from the games with side-payments to those 
ones without side-payments demands more attention to superadditivity and related 
concepts even in the deterministic case, as follows from [7] or [10]. The attention 
paid to these concepts in the fuzzified coalition game theory would be proportional 
to the increased complexity of the model and the flexibility of its elements . The 
previous sections are devoted to the fuzzification of the superadditivity and similar 
concepts for the simpler case of the games with side payments and to a brief note 
on the topics connected with the transition to games without side payments, which 
is submitted in Section 5 . 
It would be mentioned tha t the transition from the games with side payments 
to those without them is relatively simple in the case of superadditivity which was 
treated above . It is analogously simple in the deterministic case but rather com-
plicated in the fuzzified games if subadditivity and additivity are considered. This 
follows from the rather complicated fuzzification of the domination and superopti-
mum concepts (see, e .g., [4]). The convexity concept becomes quite complicated 
even if it is translated to the deterministic games without side-payments (see [10]) 
and its fuzzification for those games was not approached, yet. 
(Received March 17, 1998.) 
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